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1 Introduction
In this paper we reconsider a frequently asked question:"Given a firm that is viewed as a
nexus oÍ contracts, does the location of ownership have any import on the firm's aggregate
efficiency of resource allocation?" A prevailing answer to this question, which we shall call
the lrrelevance Hgpothesis, is that insofar as the firm can be desctibed as a comprehensive
contract, where every contingency is thought of and built into the contract, the ownership
is irrelevant to the issue ofeff.ciency; location ofownership rights can only matter when it is
impossible to write up such a comprehensive contract at the first date [See, e.g. Hazt(1988),
Tirole(1988)]. Some have thus turned to less standard models such as incomplete contracts
for a better understanding ot the role oí ownership in firms' performance [e.g. Grossman
and Hart (1987)]. However, it would be unfortunate if the important issues of ownership
could only be sensibly discussed in non-standard framworks when standard principal-agent
models have been fully developed and comprehensive techniques are available for standard
analysis.
In fact the [rrelevance llypothesis begs the important question why the bargaining
parties necessarily always arrive at the same agreement concerning resource allocation
(to be sure, not the income distribution) in comprehensive contrncts when the underlying
ownership structure alters. It might be because that the issues of ownership structure
and the survival of organizational forms have been primarily discussed in settings with
symmetrical pre-contractual information, namely in moral hazard settings, where it has
been observed that the principal and the agent(s) always end up with an incentive scheme
which is Pareto efficient, irrespective of who designs the incentive scheme(See I{art and
Holmstrbm (1987)]. Thus saying that ownership does not matter is correct when the
contracting parties have symmetrical information at the date when the contract is de-
signed and signed. This statement is obviously incorrect if there exist pre-contractual
informational asymmetries. For one thing, in principal-agent modela with a single pri-
vately informed agent, the second-best incentive mechanisms (with adverse selection) do
not lead to efficient resource allocatíon except for trivial cases. Therefore should the agent
be vested with the exclusive authority to decide the sharing rules, he might use his superior
knowledgc to design a rule that could make both parties better off. This intuition will be
the main theme of our discussion. Of course, in single-agent settings, once the agent has
the power to set up a payment rule for himself, it no more makes sense to have a principal,
since that would imply that the agent is the owner and the manager at the same time.
}fowever, when it concerns team production [in the sense of Alchian and Demsetz (1972)],
even if the agents have the ownership rights, they still need a residual claimant to solve
the budget balancing problem [HolmstrSm(1982)].
We arc thus motivated to investigate the ownership issues in more general, but stan-3
dard, settings of organization. That is, we shall confine ourselves to viewing the or-
gavizalion or firm a.e a nexus of romprehensiw~ contracts specifying the contingent profit
sharing rules for the organizational members. More speciGcally, we consider Lwo team pro-
duction models wlrere each agent pocesses two-dimensional private information, namely
pre-contractual private information concetning his "type" and post-contractual private in-
tormation concerning his "effort". Such models involve simultaneous (team) moral hazard
and (multi-dimensional) advF-rse selection.
In the present context ownership is understood as the right to set up the rules concern-
ing the distribution of the earnings.t The first model deals with a standard principal-agents
problem in which the residual claimant is the owner who designs the incentive mechanism
for the agents. In the second model the agents are the colletive owners of the firm who
collectively design the incentive mechanism. In order to compare efficiency implications,
we construct these models in such a way that they differ only in the underlying ownership
structures.
The rnodels are presented in the framework of a Bayesian game with incomplete in-
formation in the sense of Harsanyi (1967-68). In particular, they represent a sub-class of
the "generalized principal-agent problems" formalized by Myerson (1982)(1985). In My-
erson's model it is assumed that the principal has complete control over all possible means
of communication among the players, and it is shown that there is no loss o( generality for
the owner (mediator) to limit his attention to direct incentive compatible communication
mechanisms (DIC mechanism) where each agent reports separately and confidentially his
true type to the owner and follows the effort recommendation from the owner.~ Our model
diSers from Myerson's in that we assume public communication, i.e. all the messages sent
or received by the players are common knowledge. Consequently, direct mechanisms in the
sense of Myerson become inapplicable here and the equilibrium concept requires also some
modification. We thus introduce the definition of Bayesian incentive compatible mecha-
nism with public communication (PIC mechanism) and public c.ommunication equilibrYUm
in next section. One understands that since any public communication equilibrium implies
a commtmication equilibrium but not necessarily the reverse, the optimal solution derived
using the former equilibrium concept may not be optimal in the class of all communica-
tion mechanisms. However, in the present context, we will show that our solutions are
optimal in the general class of inechanisms. [n the case of collective ownership, we will
further show that the optimal PIC mechanisms can be first best [ex post efticiency in the
~Indeed, the concepl of ownership (or property righta) ie always wanting a good definition. Traditional
Iegal definitions of ownership have been either too specific or too vague that can be hardly uaeful for
developing penetrating insighls into the aurvival o[ ownerahip strudurea. Our conception of ownerehip,
perhaps a bit narrow, is in line with that proposed by Grossman and Hart (1981).
~Such a mechanism is also called canonical eommunication device by Forges (1986), or simply commu-
nication equibbrium by Myerson (1986).4
sense of llolmstróm and Myerson (1983)], - that is, given that each agent chooses effort
to maximize his own expected utility, there is no other mechanism that can lead to an
equilibrium in which some agents are better off, without making any agent worse off even
if the private information of all agents become public knowledge. This is an extension of
the staudard collective choice results [e.g. d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979)] with
inclusion of a passive residual claimant and (team) moral hazard problems, apart from
adverse sclection problems.
To repeat, we have a twofold purpose in this paper. First, we are interested in how
and what optimal comprehensive incentive mechanisms with public communication should
be designed by the owner given a firm's ownership structure, when potential problems of
team moral haa,ard and adverse selection exist. This is of interest in its own right as it can
be viewed as a contribution to the inct~ntive contrai~t theory, which has recently attracted
much attention. A major part of the paper will thus be devoted to derivations ot the
optimal incentive mechanisms. Secondly, we discuss normative implications of a firm's
ownership structure for its aggregate efficiency viewing the firm as a nexus of compre-
hensive contracts, and suggest that collective ownership structures with proper insurance
arrangement can be a superior organizational form, especially when the organizational
members are willing and capaóle of taking risks? We re-enforce this hypothesis by show-
ing in Sectíon 4 why, if collective ownership with passive residual claimants is superior,
the agent do not come to the principal and purchase the ownership rights. We will il-
lustrate that the fundamental reason is a mirror image oí Akerlof's "market for lemons":
the interest in purchasing the ownership rights by the agents would always convey good
news to the principal, because only agents with higher types would have such interest;
consequently, the principal would never sell his rights for any price so far as there are
agents interested in buying the rights for that price4
The paper proceeds as [ollows. We introduce the two team production models in next
section, with the definition of incentive compatibility and equilibrium under public com-
31n more concrete models, Pint (1989) usea a aimilar incentive mechaniam approach to compare the
efficiency e(fecta of having a monopoly firm owned by the state or by the private shareholdere; Roemer and
Silvealre (1989) study the welfare implicationa of various poasible ownership structurea of a monopolislic
firm, using also a similar incentive mechanism approach. In the achool of ao called "new inatitutiortal
economics" [see Frey (1989), Pommerehne (1989), and Boardman and Vining (1989), for example], one is
alao interested in explaining the variety o[ institutional (orms in terms o[ e(ficiency, which ao tar hsa been
mainly deacriptive or emperical.
'Similar problems may arise when the agenta jointly select an incentive mechaoiam withoat aid of an
external representative: pre[erence over a particular set of inechanisma may convey information about
the private typea. This information leakage problem has motivated Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) to
atudy the "durable" decision rules. See also Crawford (1985) for a further analyaie of the dursble decision
rulee. It turns out that the optimal incentive mechanisms derived under collective ownerehip in the preaent
context are durable becauae they are ex poat Pareto efficient (see Section 4).5
munication. In Section 3 we derive explicitly the optimal incentive mechanisms under
the two ownership structures. This is done, in each case, by a sequential analysis of the
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. We first assume that the agents' effort deci-
sions were perfectly verifiable so that the problems reduce to particular multi-dimensional
adverse selection problems. A(ter characterizing the optimal solutions to the particular
problems (Propositions 2 and 3), the optimal incentive mechanisms in the more general
cases with nonverifiability of efCort decisions are constructed using these solutions. We
show t}iat when the agents are risk neutral, the optimal sharing rules derived under per-
fect effort verifiability can be implemented via incentive mechanisms quadratic or linear
in the realized joint output levels, hence the potential problems of moral hazard aze cir-
cumvented (Propositions 4 and 5). In Section 4 we discuss the comparative ownership
implications for efficíency of the two models, and illustrate the intrinsic costs which pre-
vent the agents from purchasing the ownetship rights when the rights rest initially with
the outside investors. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Suppose an organization (or firm) is to be formed where n agents are to undertake a
profitable activity. Each agent, indexed è E N-{1,..., n}, supplies nonobservable effort
e' E A-[0, !1] with a private (nonmonetary) cost or disutility V' :(e', B') E A x O` y
V'(e`,B') E R, where B' E 9' -[B',B ] is a private efficiency parameter, known ae the ètó
agent's type. Assume V' ~ O,V~~ ~ O,VB G 0, and V~B G O.s The agents are best thought
of as specialized managers and workers, and we assume that none of them is dispensable for
the activity. Assume also that it is the common knowledge that the agents' possible types
aze independently distributed, and their cumulative distribution and density functions are
given by F'(.) and f'(.) on O' (f'(.) ~ 0 on O']. Let e-(el,...,e") and B-(Bt,...,Bn).
The agents' effort together with some technology (or assets) I and random states of nature
determine a monetary outcome. In order to focus on effort allocations we assume that the
technology requires a lump sum monetary investment, and let x denote the earnings net of
that lump swn capital investment, whose expected value is denoted i : c E A" -~ z(e) E R.
Assumc further that the variance oC x is independent of e and equal to o~. We assume that
z(.) is concave on A", increasing in each argument, and twice continuously differentiable.
An essential problem arises as how the profits are to be shared among the agents and
the owner(s) oC technology. We view this problem as the owner(s) designing the optimal
incentive mechanisms (or sharing rules) under informational, individual rationality and,
if required, budget balancing constraints. Let S' denote the share of profits that goes to
'When there is no ambiguity, we drop out the superscript of variablea, e.g. the paztial derivative of V'
w.r.t. B' is written Vé instead o[ VB,.6
the ith agent, whose preference functions are assumed to be additively separable in money
and effort, and linear in money. The ith agent's utility thus wtites as xi(S',ei,Bi) -
S' - V'(c', B'). The profit net of payments to the agents, i.e. W- x - ~; Si, goes to
a risk neutral residual claimant, who is called the principal when he is the owner of the
firm. All the agents and the principal are utility mauimizers. We assume that the agents
act noncooperatively in choosing their effort levels or reporting private types.
We consider incentive me~hanisms (to be called incentive mechanisms with public
communication) of the form (S,e) -((Sr,er),...,(S",en)) where S` :(a,B) E R x A~
S'(z,B) E R is the share of profits to the ith agent, called the incentive contract (or the
share function), which is a function of the observed outcome and the reported parameters,
and e' : B E O~ e'(B) E R is the effott level recommended to the ith agent, called the
eHort recommendation.s We shall later justify the use of such form ofincentive mechanisms
by applying the well known "revelation principle"(see Subsection 3.1).
An incentive mechanism determines an internal "rule of the game". The game proceeds
as tollows. The owner first proposes to the agents an incentive mechanism (S, e). Then each
agent anounces a type B' E O' to the public. After the anouncement, the agents will know
one another's share functions and effort recommendations, i.e. what incentive contract
each agent has signed with the owner and what effort level each agent is recommended
to make. We call this stage the stage of communication. We assume that when given an
incentive mechanism, an agent must decide before the communication stage whether or
not he wants to commit himself to playing the game, i.e. to signing the incentive contract.7
Once the anouncement is made, both the owner and the agents are obliged to accept the
incentive contract that become specified given all of the anounced types. In the following
stage, each agent makes some private effort and receives a share of profits according to
the sharing function when the output x ia realized.
This game setting is close to but differs in an important aspect from the aettings of
"Bayesian game with incomplete information" proposed by Myerson (1982)(1985), where
the agents are not allowed to anounce their types to the public but only to a mediator,
who then recommends secretly an effort level to each agent. Here, after communication,
uncertainty about the other agents' types and effort levels would disappear in a public
communication equilibrium (to be defined shortly). With this consideration, it is less
obvious tha.t something parallcl to the "tevelation principle" would still hold which says
that Lhe optiutal UIC medutnism is also optimal in the~ clahs of all possible mechanisms,
i.c. wc cannot immodiatcly say that an optimal 1'IC ntechanism ( to bc dcfined shortly) is
c"I'o save notation, we use the same term S' to denote both an incentive contract and a particular
amount o( payment to lhe ith agent. Similady, e' may denote an eNort recommendation to, or a particulaz
elfort level made by the ith agent. The contezt will make their meanings clear.
'[mplicit in our risk neutrality asaumption is the absence of inatitutional conatrainte auch aa limited
Iiability laws, thus all the playera can commit to playing the game.7
a generally optimal mechanism. However, in the present context, it is easy to verify using
a round-about approach that there is indeed no loss o( generality to restrict attention to
1'IC mechanisrns ( sce the remark following Proposition 4).
N'o consider two polar types o( ownership structures. Let OP denote the firm with
separated ownership and control where the owner is the principal. Oy can be interpreted
as a private ownership organization where the owner(s) hires the agents who supply labor
inputs. For instance, it may describe a classic capitalistic firm, the owners of which aze
exclusively the shareholders ~ther than the agents8 The shareholders are viewed as a
single legal person. The problems that may arise from the possible conflicta between the
common shareholders and the decision making authorities, say, the board of directors, aze
abstracted away. That is, we suppose there is an honest representative who designs the
sharing rules on behal( of the shareholders.
Let O„ denote t.hc finn with overlapped ownership and control where the agents are thc
exclusivc cullective owners. 'I'he ownership (orms nearest to O, are partnerships, co-ops,
labor managed firms, etc., but Oa may differ in that it allows outside non-owner residual
claimants. Similar to Oy, we suppose there is a single honest representative of all the
agents in Oa who desigrts the sharing rules for the organization9 Indeed, the problem
of optintal incentive mechanism design under collective ownership structure ought to be
analyzed as a cooperative game with incomplete information [Myerson(1984)]. This is a
complicated issue. However, since our íocus in this paper is not how the agents would
reach a particular agreement concerning the optimal incentive mechanisms among feasible
efficient choices (as wil) be clear, there are infinite such choices), but what optimal incentive
mechanisms they would choose, the expected utility level of any individual agent is not
important. 7'he following scenario may justify this supposition.
"'1'he agents first bargain over an incentive mechanism. '1'hen an outsider, say, an
unknown academic economist, will be invited to finally set up a sharing rule for their
organization. The agents will pay the economist a constant amount of salary (presumably
negligible, or equals the amount the principal would pay under Op) if he succeeds in
designing a sharing rule which is ez post efficient and makes all agents at least weakly
better off ez ante compared with their own bargaining solution (in the case of nonexistence
of a bargaining solution, all the agents should be better off compared with their reserved
expected utility levels for participation), otherwise he receives nothing. Thete may be
some fairness criterion that the agents would agree to suggest, but ifthey cannot reach any
agreernent mgarding this matter it will be up to the economist to decide, whose political
BThe case of mixed owncrahip with managere and workerx being alno ahareholdere ia cettainly an inter-
eating aubject which deservea being listed in the future reaearch agenda. See the ending remarke.
9In the incentive literature, such peraon is uaually called a government or eentrni ngency [e.g. Grovee
and Ledyard (1977), d'Aapremont and Gérard-Varét (1979)].8
viewpoint is presumably known by non of the agents. All the agents commit themselves
to respocting the sharing rnle the economist would design, provided t.he rule mcets their
provision. '1'he economist will be isolated from all ageuts until hc brings forward a sharing
rule so that thcre is no chance for any one to influence his decision."
Since the agents utilities are transferable in this context, there is no difficulty for this
economist to accomplish his task (see Propositions 3 and 5). Therefore, we may aimply
refer to the representative of the owner(s) the owner when the description is relevant to
both organizational sturctures for ease of exposition.
Given an incentive mechanism (S,e), each agent's strategy is a pair of functions B' :
A' H O' aud é' : O x O' ~--~ n such that the ith agent having type B' would choose to
rcport B'(B' ) and choosc cffort Icvcl é'(B, B') when B is heard and e'(B) is recommended. We
will verif,y later (sce thc rcmark following Proposition 4) that there is no loss of generality
in restricting attention to incentive mechanisms that induce each agent to report his
type trutlrfully and choose the effort level recommended by the owner, i.e. B'(B`) - B`,
ë'(B, B`) - e'(B). In other words, the owner only needs to consider sharing rules which aze
incentive compatible.
Definition: An incentive mechanism [S(.),e(-)] is Bayesiarr incentive compatíble with





c'(B`, B) E arg max F,~I(e',e-yé`,e-' ))[S~(x, (B~, B-' )) - V~(e~, B' )]~
e'
and for all B E 0, i E N,
e'(B) - é'(B',B) E argmaxE~~le.,e-,~e)1[S'(x,B)-V`(e',B')], (2)
e~
where e-' -(e~,...,e'-l,e'tt,...,e"), 9-' -(81,...,8'-t B'tt,...,9"), EB and E~~e are
the expectation operators over B and over x given e, respectively.
The above definition of PIC mechanism is a natural adaptation ot the notion of
!lnyr.4ian h~ccnfivc Cornpalibitily first. proposcd by d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979)
to thc prescnt Ilaycsian game setting with both private types and effort. Il is a modifi-
cation of Myerson's definition of incentive contpatible direcl mechanisrns (1982)(1985) or
Forges' definition of canonical communication device (1986)(1989). (1) says given that all
the other agents report the true types and follow the recommended effort levels, no agent
wants to misreport his type in the communication stage. (2) says given that all the agents9
have reported their types honestly and all the other agents would follow the recommen-
dation to choose effort levels, no agent can gain by first deviating his effort level from
what is recommended. For a given PIC mechanism, we shall call a vector of type-effort
pairs: (B,e(B)) -[(Bt,e~(B)),...,(B",c"(B))] satisfying (1) and (2) a PiC equilibrium.
Put di(ferently, PIC mechanisms induce PIC equilibria for the sub-game played among
tho agt~nts. We shall call an optimal I'IC mechanism a public communication equilibrYUm,
which is a solution to the gam" when the owner is includetl as a player whose strategies are
the incentive mechanisms. 1'his latter equilibrium concept is parallel to Fotges' canonical
communication equilibrium (1986) or simply communication equilibryum [Myerson (1986)]
where equilibrium is defined with respect to direct mechanisms.~o In next section we shall
investigate the optimal PIC mechanisms under the two organization structures of concern.
Voluntary participation gives each agent the opportunity to require a minimal expected
utilíty level at the start which we normalize to zero.tt We assume that the expected value
of x is large enough such that it is optimal to let all agents, whatever their types happen
to be, be satisfied to participate under the optimal sharing rules.1z This implies that their
individual rationality constraints at the PIC equilibria should be met, i.e.
I''a-' Hrl(rla))[.S"(x,B) - V'(c'(B),B')] 1(1 for all B' E U', i E N.
In Oy, the principal-owner's problem can now be stated as
Pp:
max EBE~~e(B)[x - ~ S'(x, B)]
s,~ ,
subject to (1), (2) and (3).
(3)
(4)
'aPIC mechanisms random in S and~or in e can be de.fined analogously.
"The ith agent's reaervation level of utility may be allowed to depend on B', say, ir'(B'). But then we
can replace 1"(e',B') by V'(e',B') - V'(e',B') - i'(B') to transform the problem into the preeent one.
'aA more general analyais is to assign a probability r'(-) on 9 ot the acceptance ofthe ith agent. Then we
need to specify óhe possible consequencea of one or some agents' exclusion from cooperation, e.g. whether
the project would be abandoned, or could still be carried out by the remaining agenta, or the excluded
agents could be replaced by someone else, etc. I[ no agent is dispenaible for realizing the project, an
unverified conjecture is that there is an acceptance level a E e auch that r'(B) - r(B) tor all i E N where
r(B) - 1 i[ B~ a and r(B) - 0 i( (or some i, B' G a'. This would be a generalizatán of lhe reault in Baron
and Myerson (1982). If this were true, then the lower bound of 6', B', could be taken aa o' to juatify our
assumption. If there are many candidales applying for each job, the owner may organize auctiona to eelect
one agent from each group. According to a reault in [Laffont and Tirole (1987)] whicó builda the close
link between auction design and incentive mechaniam design, we conjectute that the auction in the present
context will allow the owner to select the most efficient agent in euh group, and the incentive contract
o(fered to the ith agent (the most efficient in the ith group) will reaemble the optimal incentive contract
desiqnecl ín this context with B' modified as the second ith bidder's announcai type (ur i E N. [t ie lese
elear abuul thc ulhcr ra..~s. Se~c lho Jisivvaiun in thc last .w~ction.10
In Oa, we assume that the agents' collective objective is to maximize the sum of all
the agents' expected utilities (as will be justified by the efficiency result in Proposition
5), subject to the PIC and individual rationality constraints, and the expected budget
balancing constraint
F'AE~i~~al[x - ~ S'(x, B)1- o (5)
'fhe collective-owners' problem thus writes as
Pa:
s~EaEsie~e} ~(s'(x, e) - ~'(e'(a),e')] (s)
subject to ( 1), (2), (3) and (5). '
It is clear that botlt models involve problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.
The moral hazard problems stem from the nonobservability ofeffort which gives each agent
the opportunity to reduce effort while not bearing the full consequence of the reduced
outcome resulting from the reduction of his private effort.13 The owner's ability to infet
the true Icvel of efïort made by each agent or the agents as a group is further weakened
by the randomness oC the outcome, which contributes to collective as well as individual
moral hazard. Adverse selection stems from the uncertainty of each agent's type, whích
enables the agents to enjoy some extra informational rents, as will be clear later.
The next section is devoted to solving problems Pp and Pe. The collection of the
assumptions that we made in this section will be called A1.
3 Optimal incentive mechanisms
We take two steps to solve the problems Pp and Pg. We first derive the optimal mecha-
nisms under the assumption that the agents' individual effort levels are perfectly observ-
able. Then, by construction, we derive the optimal PIC mechanisms under nonobservabil-
ity of effort.
3.1 Optimal mechanisms under perfect effort observability
If the eKort level of each agent is observable, hence enforceable, the agents do not have
the freedom to choose the effort levels. An immediate consequence is that the incentive
mechanisms need not depend on x, because for any incentive mechanism (S(x,B),e(B))
depending on x, the mechanism (S(B),e(B)) -(Ezle(s)S(x,9),e(B)) will give each agent
~~Holmstróm (1982) uses the term `team moral hazard' to describe this íree riding problem.11
the same problem of utility maximization, hence induce the same equilibtium and give the
owner the same expected return.14
Witli efíort observability our problem reduces to a Bayesian game with incomplete
information in the conventional sense, i.e. the informational asymmetry only occurs be-
fore the contractual date. This is a pure adverse selection problem to which the standazd
revelation principle can be applied, thus the use of incentive compatible mechanisms is
justified here [e.g., Harris anc' Townsend (1981)]. A Bayesian incentive compatible mecha-
nism (.S(B), e(B)) (where e(B) is enforceable) should induce the agents to report their types
truthfully, i.e. should satisfy [d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979)]
ei E arg max EB-. [si(èi,B-i )- v~(e~(é~, e-i ), ei)] (7)
B~
forallB'EO',iEN.
Write the ith agent's optimal expected utility given a Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanism as
x~(B') ~-r Ee-~[S~(B) - V'(e~(B), B')] (8)
The principal-owner's problem is
PpA:
max F,q[z(c(B)) - ~ S'(B)]
S,e
subjectto(7)anda'(B')~OforallB'EO',iEN.
And the collective-owners' problem is
PaA:
max Ee[ï(e(B)) - ~ V'(e`(B),B')] s,e ~
(10)
subject to (7) and ~r'(B') ~ 0 for all B` E A', i E N. Note that in P~ we have simplified the
programme by inserting the expected budget balancing constraint (5) into the objective
function in (6).
'I'o ensure the existence of a(deterministic) solution, some more assumptions on the
prcfercnci~ and dislribution functions may be nceded: for all i E N and B' E n',
Az: i) ïe,(o.e-i) ~ v~(o,ei) - [(1- ~'i(B'))II'(B`)1~~a(~,Bi);
ii) ze,(Il,e-') e V~(B,B') for all e-' E A"-t.
A3: k''(B') G 0, wherc k'(B') - (1 - F'(B'))~j'(B').
A4: V'ee ~ 0; V~Be ? 0.
'~This amounts to saying as well that mechaniame random in S do not pay. Under proper aseumptions lo
be introduced shortly, i.e. AI-A4, we caa also show that there ie no need to conaider mechaniame random
in e.12
A`L is made to ensure the existence of an interior solution, i.e, to avoid the extreme
cases where no effort or the maximum effort is provided. A3 is a monotone hazard rate
property [e.g. Wilson(1983)]. It is a standard assumption made to avoid ~bunching", i.e.
several types of agents choosing the same level of effort [e.g. Laffont and Tirole(1987)],
and to ensure a smooth solution. A4 is also made to ensure sufficient convexity of the
problem.15
With these assumptions, we will be able to show the existence of a unique solution
to PF'A and P'A which is differentiable on A. In the present context there is no loss of
generality in restricting attention to differentiable mechanisms, provided such solutions
exist.'s Thus we may limit our attention to the differentiable solutions to PPA and PaA.
Uiven a differentiablc mechanism [S(B),e(B)], Ict a'(B',B') denote the utility of the ith
agent reporting B'. 1'he first-order condition implied by (7) is
~é.(B~,B`) - Je-'[SB.(B) - V~(e'(B),9')eé.]dF-`(9-') - 0 (11)
where O-' - O`O' and dF-'(B-') - dF'(B')...dF"-1(B'-')dF'tt(B't')...dF"(B"). Note
that ( 11) is evaluated at B' - B'. By the Envelope Theorem, this impliesl~
a`~(B') --~e- Va.(e'(B),B`)dF-'(B-') i E N (12)
(11) also implies ae B- V~Beé, evaluated at B' - B`. Thus e'B,(B) ~ 0 with ( 12) is a
necessary and sufficient condition for (7) to be satisfied with a differentiable mechanism
(recall that V'B C 0).
All the above analysis is suitable for both problems of PpA and PaA. Now we concen-
trate on solving PPA.
Since condition ( 12) implies that the agents' optimal utility is an increasing function
of their type, and the principal's utility is negatively correlated with S, hence with x, the
individual rationality constraints can be replaced by
~r`(B') - 0 for all i E N (13)
In what follows we first neglect the requirement eé,(B) ~ 0 and solve the following
adverse selr'ction problem:
~~5ce "Lun ( 19H9) tur commnnlx on Lhix aAxumplion.
~r'Ser (;ur.uorie and Lnlfout (1!IRA), Lalfonl and'hirolo (19A1i),(19P7), Iou (19gJ). Though lhow. papcrM
are concenwd witb eingle-agent models, the resulte csn be reaelily extended to the preaent mulli-agenl
situation.
"r''denol.ex the derivative with respect to B' viewing r' ae a compound (unclion o( B'; xé denotee the
partial derivative with respective only to B' explicitly appeazing in x' (not thoee via other variablea). 'The
same rule applies to other variablea.13
pns:
max~~ [i(e(B)) - ~[x'(B') } V'(e'(B),B')]]dF(B) (14)
subject to (12) and (13). [Note that from ( 8), (14) is equivalent to (9)]. Then we just
check that the solution to PAS satisfies e'e,(B) ~ 0 for all i E N, and derive the optimal
contract. for PpA from (8). PAS appears to be a generalized control problem with n"time"
dimensions (Br,...,Bn) E O. Such problems are known as multi-dimensional adverse
selection problems and could become very complicated.ts In the present model, it appears
easiest to directly prove the existence of an optimal solution and give its characterization,
though indirect metliods may also exist. The following proposition draws inspiration from
the existing theorems about the sutfcient and necessary conditions for optimal control
problems with one "time" dimension [e.g. Kamien and Schwarz(1971)].
Proposition 1: Under A1-A4, there exists a unique optimal solution to PAS. Denote
this solution by (á(B),é(B)) -[(irt(Br),e (B)),...,(á"(Bn),én(B))]. It satisfies
L' - 2e,(é(B)) - ve(é'(e),e~) t 1- F'(B')v~B(~' B B` fi(B~) O )- 0 à E N, B E 0. (15)
á'(B') --~B r~- VB(é'(B),B')dF-'(B-')dB i E N (16)
ProoL Sce Appendix. J
For deriving a solution to PPA, it remains to check whether the second-order condition
for the incentive compatibility constraint (7), i.e. ée, ~ 0, is satisfied. Differentiating (15)
w.r.t. B yields the matrix relation
Obe - -[~eL]-1~BL
The components of the Jacobian matrix pgL are Léi i, j E N, which satisfy LB~ - 0 for
i~ j, and LB, - (k'' - 1)Vee f k'VéBe ~ 0. Since peL is negative definite (x is concave,
V~~ ) 0, Veee G 0), so is its inverse [peL]-t. Thus the Jacobian matrix pBé must be
positive definite. But this implies that the diagonal components of pqé, i.e. éé„ í E N,
are all positive.
Finally, from (8) we obtaiu the optimal contract for PpA
s(B') - R(B') t V'(è'(B),B'). (17)
To summarize, we state the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Under A1-A4, there exists an optimal solution to PpA, characterized
by (15), ( 16) and (17).
'sSee Laflont, Maskin and Rochet(1987) (or the analysis of an optimal nonlinear pricing model wilh
two-dimensional characteristics.19
We next turn to solving problem PaA.
P8A can be viewed as a particular case of PpA, where the state vaziables x' do not
appear in the objective function. Thus by analogous derivation we have
Proposition 3: Under A1-A2, there exists an optimal solution to P~. Denote this
solution by ( S'(B),e'(B)). It is characterized by
ir.(c'(d)) - V;(e"(B),B') - 0 i E N, B E ~.
~"(B`) - -~B' Je-~
VB(e.i(B),B`)dF-'(B-')dB t a' i E N
(18)
(19)
s.;(B') - ~„(Bi) f y,(e.~(B) B') (20)
a'10 iEN (21)
i(e`(B)) - ~ S.;(B) - 0 (22)
Yroof: See Appendix.
Note that Proposition 3 holds under less restricted assumptions. (18), (19) and (20)
are parallel to (15), (16) and (17) respectively. Our assumption that the joint output
is high enough to allow substantial earnings to be shared by the agents can now be put
more concretely by assuming (21) and (22) to hold at the optima. (It is sufficient to add
a constant large enough amount to i.) ~ a' is the difference between the joint output
and tlte sum of the minimal amount needed to ensure that every agent, whatever his type
happens to be, will participate in the cooperation at the outset. It is clear from (18)
that the solution to PgA attains the first-best allocation of effort, hence leads to the most
efficient outcome (in the sense given in Section 4).
PPA may be viewed as a type of economy involving consumption and production of
a public guod i(e), where each agent with private type B' provides a publicly observable
input e'. In the collective choice literature it has been recognized that incentive and bud-
get balancing problems related with production and consumption of public goods when
formalized as a Bayesian game with incomplete information, can be solved simultaneously
without causing any loss of efficiency19 via judicially designed incentive mechanisms [e.g.
d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet(1979)]. Call those mechanisms A-G mechanisms. A limi-
tation of the mechanisms in our model as well as in A-G mechanisms is that the individual
rationality constraint is not necessarily satisfied, hence these mechanisms do not neces-
sarily work if the agents are not forced to participate. We have avoided this problem
191n d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet(1979) it is called outcome efficiency.15
by sintply assuming that the outcome is high enough such that the individual rationality
constraints arc not binding at the optimum.2u
1''rom 1'roposition 3, one can see that the efficiency solution will not change iCa constaatt
amount is added to or substracted from each agent's expected utility: The constant terms
a' only need to be positive and satisfy the expected budget balancing constraint. How
the agents may reach an agreement in the value oí a' for i E N is not of concern in
this paper. It may depend on the internal organizational ideology, convention, consensus
politics, decision rules and other particulars. Theoretically it would be a cooperative game,
and the question for the agents would be to choose a residual sharing rule which is in the
core. Necessarily this residual shazing rule of a` must not depend on the agents private
information, for else the optimality of (S'(x,B),e'(B)) would be jeopardized. Whatever
thc rule is, it is yuitc obvious that the agents will always agree to play coopcratively rathcr
thau breaking away. And since any division of the outcome is possible, they will always
choose a sharing rule that leads to the first-best joint outcome r".(e'(B)) (characterized by
(18), because for any sharing rule which is inefficient, all the agents can be made better-off
if they shift to the first-best sharing rules. In other words, threats of breaking away are
not credible.
3.2 Optimal incentive mechanisms under nonobservability of effort
The problems with nonobservability of effort have been given in Section 2 by PP and
Pg. With the results in the above subsection, we are ready to show that the owner can
achicvc thc optimal solution to PpA, or PaA, even when the only observable variable is
thc realizcd ,joint outcomc x. This amounts to sa,ying that undcr risk ucutrality moral
hazard can be e(Tectively eliminated without the need Cor special arrangements, such as
bonding or monitoring. Since PP (Pa) can be viewed as a more restricted case of PpA
(PaA) wtiere the choice of e(.) is subject to an additional constraint (2), it is clear that
if an incentive mechanism can guarantee the owner the same expected utility in Pp (Pa)
as in pPA (PaA), it must be an optimal solution to Pp (Pa). This is the spirit of the
following two propositions.
'"However, the problem of participation seems to be less serious with our solution than with the class
of A-G mechanisma (or Crovea-Ledyard mechanisms, understood broadly). All the incentive mechanisms
that can be classified as A-G mechaniams ahare a common properiy that they give each agent a payment
which equals the whole joint output minus an amount independent of the agenCs anounced type. It is
easy to understand that such payment structures are su(ficient but not necessary for achieving efficiency
and incentive compatibility. Since Lhe incentive compatibility conditions are not necessarily binding, the
undesirable distributional effecta, i[ any, may not be minimized in A-G mechanisms. In our model, the
incentive compatíbiGty constraints are binding at the optima, thus it is reasonable to aurmise that the
individual rationality constraints are lese likely to be violated in our solution than in A-G mechanisma. It
would be interesting to veri[y this conjecture.16
Proposition 4: Under A1-A4, there exists an optimal solution to Pp. Denote
this solution by (SD(x,B),ea(B)) -[(Sy~(x,B),eDr(B)),...,(SDn(x,B),ePn(B))]. It satisfies
e~(B) - f(B) anll
S~(x, B) - S'(B) ~ D(B)(x - i(è(B)] - C[x - i(è(B)]Z ~ Co~,
where D(B) - v~á~ eB~,(S(B),é(B)) being the solution to PPa (Proposition 2).
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark: In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that the incentive mechanism (S~, ea)
induces a PIC equilibrium. When all the agents anounce their types truthfully and obey
the effort recommendation, the expected payment to each agent equals to hia expected
payment under the optimal incentive mechanism (S,è) derived under the efíort observ-
ability assumption, and the effort level to be made by each agent equals his effort under
(S,è) for all B E O. 'I'hus the principal's as well as all the agents' expected utilities are
the same under (S,é) and (So,en).
This amounts to saying that when the agents are risk neutral, the optimal PIC mech-
anism can attain a solution in which the agents behave in a way as though their privately
taken effort were publicly observable. 5ince that solution is optimal for the adverse se-
Iection problem PpA, reduced (rom PP, the PIC mechanism (Sa,e~) so derived must be
optimal for PP in the class o[ all mechanisms.
The intuition is this: The difference between public communication and private com-
munication (as under direct mechanisms) only becomes important when the agents have
private decisions to make ajter the communication stage, because if there were no post-
communication private decision choices everything would be settled as soon as the agents
have simultaneously reported their types. This is the case with our pure multi-dimensional
adverse selection model. Moreover, the revelation principle can be applied to justify our
formulation of the multi-dimensional adverse selection problem PPA, i.e. the solution
(S,è) is optimal not only among incentive compatible mechanisms but also among all
mechanisms. To carry the argument a bit further, since the principal can always choose
not to control the agents effort levels, the solution to PPA (with effort verifiability) must
be always wcakly superior to the solution to Pn (without effort verifiability). 'L'hereforc
should the solution to PP achieves the same result as the solution to PPA, the former
solution must be optima] in the set of all mechanisms, not only in the set of PIC mecha-
nisms.
From (I6) it is clear that the agenta, except for those whose types are the lowest,
enjoy a strictly positive utility level. This amount is commonly perceived as the agent's
informational rent. Following the convention, we call (S~,e~) the second-best incentive17
mechanism. It is second best first because the principal cannot extra~ct all the agents'
information tent as he can under perfect information, and because the agents do not
provide the socially most efficient effort levels under this incentive mechanism (see the
next section).
That the quadratic mechanism structure is optimal has been shown by Fishe and
McAfee (1987) in a bidding model, and by Picazd (1988) in a single agent model. The
intuition here behind is that, when the agents are risk neutral, the principal can artifi-
cially create high individual risk linked with the joint outcome, in such a way that a PIC
equilibrium is established at the desired effort levels, where moral hazard is eliminated at
no costs. In other words, the optimal share-effort allocation can be implemented through
the incentive contract Sp. Thus the crucial aasumption is risk neutrality. An additional
perhaps substantial limitation of the quadratic form of incentive contracts is the penalty
it imposes for much better than expected outcomes. This perverse property would have
the undesirable potential effect to induce ex post moral hazard if the agents could adjust
their effort levels after observation of the states of nature. In that case, if the value of C
is large and the states of nature happen to be favorable, the agents may find their income
negativcly rorrclated with the outcome to be realized, hence it will be in their interest to
reduce effort (or even sabotage) in order to reduce the penalty. This drawback vanishes
when C in Sn drops to zero, i.e. when Sn is a linear function of x.
Note that in our multi-agents model, it may be necessary for Sp to depend on x even
if the joint outcome x is detetministic, because it may still be useful for assuring a PIC
equilibrium. This is not true for single-agent models in which the agent's effort can be
precisely inferred as soon as z is deterministic.
In the proof of Proposition 4, one can check that V~~éB; -~ VB; 1 0 is a sufficient
condition for the optimal incentive contract to be linea.r in x, i.e. for C- 0.21 We can
also deliminate the classes of cost and distribution functions which imply the linearity of
the optimal incentive contracts. But the complexity of the expressions makes it hard to
draw any meaningful economic insight.
Now we turn to problem Pa. We give the following result regarding the collective-
owners' problem which is parallel to Proposition 4.
Proposition 5: Under A1-A2, there exists an optimal solution to Pa. Denote this
solution by (S~(B),e~(B)). It satisfies e~(B) - e'(B) and
S~'(x,B) - S"(B) t Ix - x(e'(B))), l23)
(S'(B),e'(B)) being the solution to P~.
~~In single-agent models, the linear property oí the optimal incentive contract has been firet recognized
by LaR'ont and Tirole(1986), and Iater diecueaed in Picard(1987), Baron and Beeanko(1987), etc. A eimilar
properly ie also recognized in auction theoriee, e.g. Laffont and Tirole(1987), McA(ee and McMillan(19g7).18
I'rooL This is actually a corollary of Proposition 4 with C- 0, hence omitted.
'Chough in solving Pp and Pa we have not directly employed the revelation principle,
Proposition 4 and 5 do show that PIC mechanisms can be optimal. The above proposition
extends the standard results in the public good literature (i.e. A-G mechanisms) into a
model involving uncertainty of outcome, nonobservable private input levele, apart from
private types. It provides another class of inechanisms that achieve the so called Groves
result, i.e. under collective ownership the most efficient allocation of resources can be
attained if (1) the agents can be subsidized by an outside community, or (2) the agents
aze forced to remaitt with ar.d work for the community. Any one oí these two conditiona
implies that the agents' individual rationality constraints need not be reapected. In the
present ntodel, none of the above two conditions are required since we have assumed that
the optimal expected joint outcome is lazger than the expected payments to the agents?~
AL this stage, one should realize that an outside residual claimant is still necessary . We
have been considering only the expected budget balancing problems. Without an outside
residual claimant an ezact budget balancing problem which cauaes tree riding may arise
[Holmstrtim (1982)]. In fact this residual revenue claimant dces not have to be a residual
control claimant, therefore dces not have to be an owner. He only needs to serve the
function of an insurer. The agents and the residual claimant only need to sign a contract
which legalizes the residual claimant's right to receive ~ - x-~; S~' when ~ 1 0 and
the obligation to pay the amount -~ when ~ G 0. But will this residual claimant face
moral hazard problems? The answer is No. A second look at the sharing rule (S~,e~)
reveals that the problem the residual claimant faces is quite benign. Under the sharing
rules (S~(x, B), e~(B)) defined in (23), the agents can shitt the outcome distribution to the
detriment of the residual claimant only by providing more effort than required, for the
expected residual equals (n - 1)[i(e') - ï(e)]. But the marginal benefit from providing
extra effort is a public good since it is shared by all the agents, while the marginal cost
is borne individually. Thus no agent would likc to increase the effort above the first-best
IeveL It is also clear the agents do not have any incentive to make less than the first-best
effort levels as well?3
~~It is important to remark that the indispensability of any agent for cooperation requires comenaus
for any internal eharing rule. The efficiency result may not hold if a eub-group o[ the agenta can decide
the rule. In that case, the problem becomea a new free reder-moral hazud-adverae selection model vrith
the owner-group trying to ezploit the reat o( the agenta aa much as poeaible. For an analyeie of thia kind
involving only adverae aelection, see Boyd, Prescott and Smith (1988).
~~Here we find a very apecial type o[residual claimanta. Though their income takea the form ofa reaidual
return, it ie a.ctually negatively correlated to the net tarninga o[ the firm. Whether such residusl clsimanta
atist in the real world ia an empirical iasoe. Posaible examplee are inaursnce companies, shueholdera
having no voting righta, etc. Anyway, ehe theoretical poeaibifity otauch type of reaidual claimant remindea
ue that viewing the reaidual claimants as identical to the ownera of a firm can be mieleading. It ia not
neceseary either that reaidual claimanta would face incentive probleme under asymmetric information.19
4 Ownership structure and efficiency implications
The socially most efficient outcome (first-best) in the context of our model ia naturally the
one that maximizes the expected net surplus i-~; V'. This first-best solution can only
be achieved when each agent chooses the effort level which equatea his mazginal private
cost with the marginal outcome, i.e.
i~. - V~ - 0, i E N. (24)
From (15) we see that in Oy the optimal (second-best) incentive mechanism does not
attain the most efficient outcome since at the equilibrium the marginal outcome exceeds
the marginal cost of effort for all the possible combinationa of the typea of agents, except
for the unique case when all the agents are of the highest posaible type; the firat-best
outcome is not attained even some of the agents are of the highest type. Nevertheless,
the first-best outcome can be achieved under cooperative ownership structures with an
outside risk-neutral residual claimant, as has been shown by Proposition 3 and 5. This
observation drives home the proposition that ownership can mattet for efficiency even it
one views the firm as a complete comprehensíve contract. One might then ask, in the
spirit of "Coase Theorem", why in Oy the agents cannot persuade the principal via side
payments or bribing to adopt a first-best sharing rule so that all the participants would
be better off. To put the question more specifically, since the agents can calculate the
expected earning to the principal in a second-best solution, why not let them purchase
for a price equal to that value the right of ownership so that they can choose the sharing
rules they pre(er?
The answer to that question is not obvious, but has indeed been given by the "revelation
principle". To see this point, imagine any possible sort of negotiation that may take place
between the principal and the agents. It can but be a communication proceas whereby the
participants receive messages, and form their strategies based on the messages received,
as well as on their private information?4 The communication process does not have to be
a one-stage affair; with every one trying to drive a hard bargain, there can be bickering
about on all sides. But what the revelation principle says is that in the present context,
bickering notwithstanding, it does not pay for the principal to follow any long-winded
communication process other than restricting himself to a single-stage communication
process in which the agents are just required to report their types directly. On the other
side of the coin, any final agreement is nothing but about a sharing rule, which ought to
have re(Iected any consideration of side payments.
It might be instructive to show this point more clearly. Consider what will happen
if the agents collectively decide to purchase the ownership right from the principal for a
~~See Myereon (1982) for a deacription o[ the communication procesa.20
pria~ ~,qnal to tói~ prinripal's uptimal expoctod roUirn solw~d from Pt'. D~~nute lhis pric~~
by W, as having been shown it is also the principal's optimal expected utility solved from
PAS, which is given by
W -
J
(i(é(B)) - ~[á'(B') } V`(é(B),B')]JdF(B)
e ,
whete (ir'(B'),é'(B)) is the optimal solution to PAS satisfying conditions (15) and (I6).
In this case the agents can be perceived as playing a two-phase game. They play coop-
eratively in the first phase in deciding whether to take over the firm, and then choose an
incentive mechanism solved from Pa under their collective ownership. By our assumption
that no agent is dispensable for the cooperation, a unanimous agreement is necessary.25
In the second phase, the agents will play noncooperatively in announcing their types and
in choosing their private effort levels under the new incentive mechanism.
We have characterized the optimal PIC mechanisms under the agents' collective own-
ership in Proposition 5. This optimal solution ought to be known by the principal as well.
Recall that in O, the ith agent's expected utility is given by x". Let p', ~' A' - W, be
the share ot the ith agent to be paid for the ownership right. We show that it is impos-
sible for a"(B') -~i' to be positive for all i E N and B' E ~'. In fact, it on the contrary
a"(B') - A' ? 0 for all i E N and B' E O', x"(B') - p' and e"(B) would satisfy all the
constraints ín PAS, and the following contradiction would result:
W~ f[i(e'(B)) -~(x"(B`) t V'(e"(B),B`)]]dF(B) - W
e ;
The above inequality results from that (A"(B'), e"(B)) diffets from the unique optimal
solution to PAS, i.e. (á'(B'), é'(B)). The equality is due to the budget balancing condition
(22), which implies
i(e'(B)) - ~[a"(B') f V'(e"(B),B')] - W
for all B E O. Since x"(B') increases in B', we can derive from the above observation that
there exist ~' ~ B' with strict inequalities at Ieast for some i E N, such that for ith agent
having type lowcr or cyual to {` he is better off not being the owner. Thus, only the agents
with relativcly high types may havc an interest in purchasing the ownership rights. But
should they come to the principal to propose a deal, Lhe principal would infer U~at they
have higher types and the principal's expected earning would thus shift upward, and so
~'We conjecture that a eimilar analysin can be carried over to the casee where one or eome of the agenta
can take over the firm'e technology. Only new coneiderationa will emerge [aee Myereon(1983)] and the
analyeis will be heyond the scope of the preaent model.zi
the agents would have to offet something more than the principal's originally expected
return W. The problem is, at any price, the principal would never clinch a deal as far
as there are agents who want to purchase his rights, because the fact that some agents
a,rc interested in his rights is always a signal that his expected return without selling the
rights is higher thau the price o(fered. Of course, such behavior ought to be anticipated
by the agents, and they would rather pretend not to be interested in having the rights
at any price above the príncipal's original expected earning. Thus the transfer of rights
will never happen. This exar.rple is nothing but a mirror case of Akerlof's "market for
lemons".
The impossibility of improving efficiency through ownership transactions under sep-
arated ownership and management allows us to conclude that in the presence of pre-
contractual informational asymmetries (or transaction costs) among the members ofa firm,
the initial location of ownership rights matters for its efficiency in resource allocation.2s
In fact we have something more to say. Namely, given that agents are risk neutral, it can
be more efficient to have the ownership of the firm rest with the agents as a group than
with outside investors. To be sure, in order that the agents' cooperation is viable, or at
least feasible, their financial capacity must be great enough to permit them to purchase,
or take out loans within admissible cost limits to purchase the required assets. Of course,
they may try tn run a pure rental firm as well (if they can manage to do so), but then
new moral hazard problems may arise [Jensen and Meckling (1976)].
Here wc find a possible rationale for a third-party intervention. Suppose before the
agents and the principal meet, a third party can impose an inatitutional rule that the
agents have the right to decide a sharing rule, on condition that they do not abuse the
right, i.e. the principal must be guaranteed a minimal expected return equal to what he
would get iC the right were vested with him. Then it is easy to see that both the principal
and the agents are better off. We seem to have Cound a theoretical instance that mandatory
codetermination can improve efficiency.Z~
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have only considered two extreme cases of a firm's ownership struc-
ture: one with complete separation ofownership and management, another with complete
overlap of ownership and management. We have derived explicitly the optimal PIC mech-
anisms under the two ownership structures, and shown that the public communication
~'The import of organizational structures on eificiency han actually been noliced by eome authora in
different adverse selectiou contexta, e.g. Miyazaki (1977), Itoyd, Prescott and Smith ( 19Rg), though thc
ieaue of owncrship has not becn addressed expliciUy.
~TFor a recent property rights analysis of codetermination, see Furubotn(1988).22
equilibrium derived under the former structure does not attain the socially most efficient
output while it does under the latter structure. From the model analysis this implies that
the ownership structure of an organization (even viewed as a comprehensive contract)
matters for its resource allocation e~ciency, and the collective ownership structure with
the operating agents (managers, workers, etc.) being the owners of the firm can be an
efficient form of organization. The caveat is the risk neutrality assumption, which implies
that the agents have unlimited financial capacity to raise funds, and that there is no gain
in risk diversification.
It would be interesting to continue the line ofresearch to investigate the joint-ownership
structure, where the firm is owned by outside investors and the employees [the case of
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), for instance], with emphasis perhaps on the
welfare implications of different power(voting right) distributions for each group, and
the social efficiency implications. We may also examine the efficiency implications of the
optimal incentive structure under collective ownership without external residual claimants,
namely with strict budget balancing constraint. It is not clear whether the solutíon will
still dominate [e.g. in terms of interim or ex post ef6ciency in the sense of Hollnstrtim and
Myerson (1983)] the solution derived under separation of ownership and management.
Ownership structures of modern corporations or organizations have undergone, and
are still undergoing, significant evolution. Our analysis in this paper might provide some
explanation, even from merely a narrow point of view of incentive related resource alloca-
tional eflïciency, for the real world phenomena such as company buyouts by management,
and application of ESOPs, which are currently becoming quite fashionableZs Of course,
the extent of the relevance between theory and practice is always subject to subsequent
judgement.
This paper is only a modest attempt to investigate the efficiency implications of the
ownership structure of a firm by explicit comparison ofcontractual solutions. We cite Klein
(1983) to close:"Getting one's hands dirty to obtain a fuller description ofthe agency prob-
lems and contractual solutions in various forms at various times is likely to produce both
a modified theoretical framework and further convincing evidence regarding the survival
characteristics of alternative organizational arrangements. Certainly our view of large,
complex organizations will continue to become much richer [...]."
~a.lust recall thaL one oí the biggest takeover battles in hiatory, the case of RJR Nabisco, was initiated
by the comyany's own management group. And see TIME, Fe6.13,1989, for a report on some evidence of
how ESOPs have enhanced efi'iciency, or company's value, in the United States. Of couree, there are many
other convincing explanations for these phenomena.23
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: i) Existence and Uniqueness: Let L -(L1,...,L"). (15) gives
n equations !,' - 0, i E N. From A2 we can check that L' ~ 0 for e' close to 0 and L' C 0
for e' close to B. Thus by continuity of L' there exists e - (e~, ..., e„) E A" which satisfies
L - 0 for all B E O. Since from A1-A4 i is concave and V'(e',B`) - r~~B~~ VB(e',B') is
convex in e for all i E N, the tlessian matrix of i(e) - V'(e`, B') - 1~~e~~ VB(e', B') with
respect to e must be negative definite, which implies that the Jacobian of L with respect
to e is strictly negative. From the Implicit Function Theorem, this implies that there
exists a uniqnP vector valucd function è : O-~ A", differentiable on 0. It is then easy to
see that given è(B), (12) and (13) determines a unique x(B), which is given by ( 16). Such
solved è(B) and á(B) obviously satisfy (12) and (13).
ii)Sufticicncy:
Let C(B,a,e) - i(e) -~;[a' ~ V'(e`,B')] and let v`(B`) - 1-~ B~ . It is cleaz that !'(e')
è'(B) is the solution to problem
max[G(B,~r,e) f ~A` f ~v'VB(e',B`)]
e
for specific values of B and a. (Note that ~; ~r' is cancelled out, hence è does not depend
on n. And the concavity of the problem is ensured by A1-A4.)
Now choose a pair offunctions (a(B), e(B)) different from (ir(B), è(B)) which also satisfies
conditions ( 12) and ( 13). We compare the principal's expected welfare with (ir(B),è(B))
and (a(B), e(B)), denoted W and W respectively:
0 -W-~'
-~~[G(B, ir, è) - G(B, a, e)]dF(B)
- 1 [[G(B,~,é) f ~x~ t ~~~Vé(e~,B')]
A ~ ~
-[G(B, x, e) f~~~ }~ ~~Vé (e', B')]
- ~~'Vé(è',9') f ~~~Vé(P',B') - ~(~' - ~r')]dF~(B)
~ , ~
~ fe[~"'Vé(e',B')-~v'Vé(é~6`)-~(~'-x')]dF(B)
Integrating by parts and using (12) and ( 13) we can derive
le~(~' - n')~F'(B)
- ~ ~e~[~(B~) - x(B')]d~`(B')24
- ~ Je~ ~F~(B~ ) - I] Je-~
~Vé(e'(B), B') - Vé(~'(B), B')]dF-'(B-' )dB'
- f ~~~'Vé(e',B')-~'VéÍé',B')]dF(B) e .
Thus ~ 1 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: i) Existence: By the concavety of i and the convexity of
V', and by assumption A2, e"~B), i E N is uniquely determined by (18). Consequently
a"(B') is given by (19) and S"(B') given by (20). In the statement of this propoaition,
a' is quite arbitary so far as it is not negative and the sum of them ensures the budgte
balancing constraint (22). In assumption A1 we have assumed that the joint output is
high enough such that it is suboptimal to give up cooperation for whatever reported types.
To put it more concretely, we assume i(e'(B)) -~; S"(B) 1 0 for a' - 0, i E N. Note
that it is sufficient to add a constant amount to i to ensure this assumption.
It remains to check ií the constraints in PaA are satisfied. n"(B') obviously is non-
negative given that a' ~ 0, and from the preceeding analysis it has been shown that
(ï) is equivalent to (12), which ~r"(B') clearly satisfies for i E N. Thus the existence of
(S'(B),e'(B)) is proved.
ii)Sufficiency:
Let G(B, e) - ï(e) -~; V'(e', B') be the integrand of the objective functional in PeA.
It is clear that e'(B) -(e'i(B),...,e'"(B)) is the solution to problem
max G(B, e) ~
for specific values of B. This implies that for any other function e(B), G(B,e'(B)) 1
G(B,e(B)) for all B E O. Thus
fe G(B,e'(B))dF-' ~ J
e- G(B,c(B))dF-'
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Under A1-A4, and by Proposition 2, (Sp, ep) is well defined
since S and é are well defined. Given (Sa,ep), let n'(B`,e`,B') be the expected utility of
agent i reporting B` and choosing effort e' when the other agents play the PIC equilibrium
strategies. Let ~r(B',e`,B) denote the áth agent's utility whose type is B' and who has
anounced B`, after the stage of communication when the other agents have announced B-'
and are expected to follow the mediator's recommended effort levels. For neatness let
i- i(é(B',B-`)) and i- ï(e', é-'(B', B-')). a(B', e`, B) writes as
Á(B',e',B)
- S'(B',B-') f D(B'.B-')(ï - i) - CE~I(P~.è-~(ó~.e-'))~x - ï t i- i]Z f Co~ - V(e',B')
- s'(é`,e-') f D(é',e-')(ï - i) - c(i - i)' - v(e`,e`)25
and rr'(B',e',B') writes as
a'(B' e' B') - ~ ~(B',e' B)dF-~
e-.
We first check that Sp induces a PIC equilibrium [See (1) and (2)]. The first and
second-order conditions for (2) given ith agent's announcement B' should be
ire,(B`,e',B) - [D(B',B-`) - 2C(i - i)]i~. - V~(e',B') - 0. (25)
torallB'EO',BEOandiEN,and
á~.e, -[D - 2C(i - i)]2~.e. - Vé- 2C2~, C ~ (26)
for all B' E O', B E O and i E N. (26) is obviously satisfied for e' - é'(B',B-')) and for C
sufficiently large.
LeL e(B',B) denote the solution to (25). By the definition of D(B), it is easy to check
that wheu B' - B', c~(B',B) - è'(B).
Given e' - e(B',B), by the Envelope Theorem or using (25) the first-order condition
for (1) should be
~o,(B',P(B',B),B') - JA-~ SB,(B`,B-`) - v~(e'(B',B-')éa.(B',B-')
t[De~(B',B-`) f 2Ci~,éé~(B',B-')](Z - i)
f[D(B', B-') - 2C(i - i)]pe-~(i - i)pè;ë-'(B`,B-')dF-' -l(E7)
where e' - é(B',B) in i. 29
When Bi - B', from (12) and (17)
Sé,(B',B-`)-Vé(ë'(B',B-`)ëé,(B',B-`)dF-' -0,
e-;
thus (27) is satisfied because i- i and p~-,zpB,ë-' - p~-,ipe,ë-'.
The second-order condition for (I) requiros
~è.è.(B',é (B',B),B') ~ 0
We show that this condition is also met for B' - B'. Differentiating ~;(B',ë'(B),B) and
aB,(B`,é'(B),B) w.r.t. B' we derive
irB,B, f áB,e,ë`g, - 0
~sp~-.i (i) denotes the gradient vector o( i (i) with reapect to e-', similarly pg,i" denotes the
gradicnt vectm n( é-' with respect to B'. We neglect the transpoeition aigns for neatnese.26
and
áe,B, f xe,e,éB. f ~e,B, - 0.
'('wice differentiating A yields, for C sufficiently large,
xe,e, - D(B)ie,e. - V~ - 2C2~, ~ 0
H
~e~8~ - - eB 1 ~
It follows that, for C sufi'iciently large (since x',e, --. -oo as C-~ oo),
~e,g, - -~e.e,fá, - ~e,g, J ~.
Thus
A'- - r í~r- dF-'--J
á è,dF-'C0
B,B, J9 ~
B,g, e- g.e. B
forallB'EO'andiEN.
Thus Sp induces a PIC equilibrium. When all the agents play PIC equilibrium strate-
gies, their individual rationality constraints are clearly satisfied, and the principal obtains
the expected utility as though he could observe the agents' effort. This implies that SD is
optimal to P~. Q.E.D.
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